Going for Three Pointer

Here is a game theory analysis of an end-of-game basketball scenario. This paper by Shawn Ruminski appeared in Presh Talwalkar’s blog, Mind Your Decisions. Here is the problem.

The fourth quarter is approaching its end. Team A is leading the game with two points and with the shot clock turned off. The ball is now with Team B. They have two choices: aim for a win with a three-point attempt or a tie (and Overtime) with a two-pointer attempt. What is the right strategy?

Here are some assumptions:

  1. Open 2-point Field Goal %: 62.5
  2. Open 3-point Field Goal %: 50.0
  3. Contested 2-point Field Goal %: 35.7
  4. Contested 3-point Field Goal %: 22.8
  5. The chance of winning the O/T is 50:50

Team B has two choices: attempt 2 or 3 points, and Team B has two: defend 2 or 3. Following are the payoffs.

If Team B goes for a 2-pointer and Team A defends against a 2-pointer. The probability of team B winning is 0.357 x 0.5 = 0.179 (FG% for a contested 2 pt followed by winning in O/T).

If Team B goes for a 2-pointer and Team A defends against a 3-pointer. The probability of team B winning is 0.625 x 0.5 = 0.313 (FG% for an open 2 pt followed by winning in O/T).

If Team B goes for a 3-pointer and Team A defends against a 2-pointer. The probability of team B winning is 0.5 x 1 = 0.5.

If Team B goes for a 3-pointer and Team A defends against a 3-pointer. The probability of team B winning is 0.228 x 1 = 0.228

Team A (Defend)
Defend 2Defend 3
Team B
(Shoot)
Shoot 2(0.18, 0.82)(0.31, 0.69)
Shoot 3(0.50, 0.50)(0.23, 0.77)

As you can see from the payoff matrix, there is no dominant strategy for either team; therefore, there must be a mixed strategy.

Reference

Game theory applied to basketball by Shawn Ruminski: Mind Your Decisions.