Airport Problem and the Shapley Solution

Here is how we apply the concept of Shapley Values to the famous airport problem.
Suppose an airport wants to build a runway to support three airline companies. Here are the requirements for each company:
Airline 1: 1500 m
Airline 2: 2200 m
Airline 3: 3000 m
Assume the cost per m of runway construction is $1k. How must the airport split costs among the three airline companies fairly?

Proportional rule

The simplest way is to split the cost proportional to the length each airliner needs, i.e., you divide the total cost proportional to the runway requirements as:

Airline 1: 3000 x 1500 / (1500 + 2200 + 3000 ) = 672k
Airline 2: 3000 x 2200 / (1500 + 2200 + 3000 ) = 985k
Airline 3: 3000 x 3000 / (1500 + 2200 + 3000 ) = 1343k

Is it a fair division? It seems so. But what happens if Airline 3 comes up with a variation, say, change to 3500? The new contributions get modified to:
Airline 1: 729k
Airline 2: 1069k
Airline 3: 1701k

Suddenly, this seems unfair for Airlines 1 and 2 as the new plan only benefits the third one, but the others also bear the extra costs (729 – 672) and (1069 – 985), respectively. So, we try the Shapley values:

Shapley value

We have seen how it works in the previous post. Let’s build the table first for case 1.

C(1500, 2200, 3000)

Combination 123
1231500700800
132150001500
23102200800
21302200800
312003000
321003000
Average3000/6
= 500
5100/6
= 850
9900/6
= 1650

And for case 2, C(1500, 2200, 3500):

Combination 123
12315007001300
132150002000
231022001300
213022001300
312003500
321003500
Average3000/6
= 500
5100/6
= 850
12900/6
= 2150

Case 1:
Shapley value Airline 1 = 500
Shapley value Airline 2 = 850
Shapley value Airline 3 = 1650

Case 2:
Shapley value Airline 1 = 500
Shapley value Airline 2 = 850
Shapley value Airline 3 = 2150

The game theory solution does not penalise the first two airlines and only demands the third one to pay for the scope change.